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the case of public LED street lighting in German municipalities 
Friedemann Polzin*,1,2, Paschen von Flotow2 & Colin Nolden3 
Abstract: In this paper we analyse the case for public application of LED street lighting. Drawing from 
the energy services literature and transaction cost economics, we compare modes of lighting 
governance for modernisation. We argue that servitization can accelerate the commercialisation and 
diffusion of end-use energy demand reduction (EUED) technologies in the public sector if third party 
energy service companies (ESCo) overcome technological, institutional and economic barriers that 
accompany the introduction of such technologies resulting in transaction costs. This can only succeed 
with a supportive policy framework and an environment conducive towards the dissemination of 
specific technological and commercial knowledge required for the diffusion process. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy efficiency is increasingly considered the cheapest and most effective way of addressing issues 
such as climate change and energy security (EC, 2014; IEA, 2014a, 2014b; IPCC, 2014). However, 
investments in associated technologies remain below the optimal level as the markets for energy 
efficiency are subject to severe system failures (IEA, 2013a). Consequently, the rate of adoption and 
diffusion is low as structures and incentives for application are missing (Jaffe et al., 2005; Schleich, 
2009; Sorrell et al., 2004). In this paper we analyse the case of public sector application of LED (light-
emitting diodes) street lighting in Germany as an example of a market where some of the barriers are 
being addressed through servitization.  
The lighting industry has recently undergone major shifts from traditional lamps towards LED with 
significant savings in terms of finance and energy possible under laboratory conditions but limited 
experience in real world settings (IEA, 2013b). As a result, application of this technology is proving to 
be challenging for both manufacturers and customers (Bergek and Onufrey, 2013; Sanderson and 
Simons, 2014; Smink et al., 2013), despite forecasts of LED market shares increasing from less than 
10% to 70% by 2020 (McKinsey, 2012). Public procurement is considered a significant driver in the 
innovation and diffusion process (Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 
2012) and in this paper we analyse the role of different governance arrangements available to German 
municipalities for LED street lighting. 
Street lighting in Germany represents a major cost factor, accounting for almost one third of municipal 
electricity budgets (DStGB, 2010). This provides a strong incentive for municipalities to take the lead 
in the diffusion of more efficient technologies (Radulovic et al., 2011; Schönberger, 2013). 
Municipalities, however, are typically short in budgets although they need to invest in energy 
efficiency not only to alleviate financial constraints but also to meet their own as well as national 
climate change targets (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; dena, 2015; Hartmann et al., 2014; Hendricks, 2014). 
Energy service companies (ESCos) can help overcome some of these barriers by ‘servitising’ public 
sector LED street lighting using energy service contracts. ESCos have primarily been analysed in the 
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context of markets (Bertoldi et al., 2014; Marino et al., 2011, 2010) while ‘servitization’ is commonly 
analysed from a business perspective through product-service systems (Steinberger et al., 2009). 
This paper merges these areas of research by drawing from the energy services literature based on 
transaction cost economics and arguing that ‘servitization’ involving third-party contractors can 
accelerate the commercialisation and diffusion of energy efficiency technologies and help overcome 
systemic barriers. Compared to the traditional in-house approach to energy management, alternative 
approaches primarily imply the establishment of hybrid forms of economic organisation or more 
market based solutions through outsourcing (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002; Williamson, 1985). 
The example of Germany is particularly revealing as municipal independence and its federal state 
structure have lent themselves to the establishment of diverse governance mechanisms for the 
provision of public services. Additionally, Government launched an energy service contracting 
initiative by providing standardised contracts (SBI, 2013). Hence our research questions reads as 
follows: What is the role of energy service contracting in addressing the barriers to commercialisation 
and diffusion of LED street lighting in Germany? 
Combining a longitudinal archival document analysis and 40 semi-structured interviews, our analysis 
points towards energy service contracting contributing to LED street lighting diffusion in German 
municipalities under specific institutional conditions. Section 2 introduces the main literature streams, 
theoretical framework and research design including the qualitative research approach and the data. 
Section 3 displays the results which form the basis for discussion (Section 4) and conclusion (Section 
5), including policy implications. 
2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
2.1. Challenges facing adoption of novel end-use energy demand technologies 
One way to address climate change by uncoupling economic growth from the use of finite resources is 
low-carbon innovation (Foxon et al., 2008; Popp, 2010). Compared to supply side low-carbon 
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technologies, end-use energy demand reduction technologies (EUEDs) 1 , which could contribute 
significantly to reaching climate change targets while reducing costs and dependency on fossil fuels, 
have been marginalised (IEA, 2014a, 2014b; Mickwitz et al., 2008; Sovacool, 2009). Wilson et al. 
(2012) attribute this to the nature of these technologies, such as diversity and widespread application, 
small scale and low visibility. 
Barriers to the diffusion process arise from complex interdependent factors that relate to the nature of 
innovation and environmental externalities. Technological factors comprise uncertainty about the 
dominant design, quality, increased complexity of innovative technologies and application (Jackson, 
2010; Schleich, 2009; Sorrell et al., 2004; van Soest and Bulte, 2001). Institutional barriers such as 
path dependent technological application due to investments into corresponding infrastructure, low 
acceptance among the local population or unanticipated or reoccurring changes in the policy design 
and administrative approval also impede the technological diffusion process (Foxon et al., 2008; Iyer 
et al., 2013; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Steinbach, 2013; Wilson et al., 2012). Volatile or artificially 
low energy prices and incomplete carbon markets represent economic barriers to diffusion by 
increasing uncertainty and rendering investments in novel EUEDs unprofitable, which lead to slow 
capital stock turnover and corresponding long payback periods as upfront costs are high (Gallagher et 
al., 2006; Jaffe et al., 2005; Sorrell et al., 2004). To examine these factors, potential users require 
enhanced competencies and capacities (Jacobsson and Karltorp, 2013; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; 
Schleich, 2009; Sorrell et al., 2004). Hence customers often ‘wait’ for future improvements and fail to 
harness current savings. This is referred to as ‘energy efficiency paradox’ (van Soest and Bulte, 2001). 
The above mentioned factors represent key barriers for a range of EUEDs, including lighting (Mills 
and Schleich, 2014), which this paper seeks to address. 
                                                     
1  An ‘end-use energy demand reduction technology’ can be defined as ‘the reduction of the absolute 
consumption of primary energy’ (e.g. electricity, fuel) (Herring, 2006; Wilson et al., 2012); see also: 
http://www.eued.ac.uk/whatiseued  
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To support the uptake of novel technologies, scholars highlight the importance of demand side 
measures, among which public procurement is one key element (Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Guerzoni 
and Raiteri, 2014). Public procurement can also contribute to satisfying unsatisfied human needs and 
solving societal problems, such as climate change, if appropriate innovations are supported (Edquist 
and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). However, this process is subject to a set of barriers perceived by 
suppliers of innovative goods, such as the lack of interaction with procuring organisations, the use of 
over-specified tenders as opposed to outcome based specifications, low competences of the procurers 
and a poor management of risk during the procurement process (Uyarra et al., 2014).  
Governments, like municipalities, are typically running on a very tight budget, which limits their 
abilities to procure innovative EUEDs (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012; Hartmann et al., 
2014). In this case third-party contracting, a specific form of public procurement and public-private-
cooperation, can be a solution (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Hartmann et al., 2014; Helle, 1997; Hypko et 
al., 2010a; Roehrich et al., 2014). The literature has highlighted the design of contractual arrangements 
(mode of governance) regarding contract duration and responsibilities as a critical factor to address the 
complexity in the procurement process, especially with regard to public infrastructure (Hartmann et al., 
2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). It has been suggested that public agencies need to 'identify the 
procurement level and the contractual and relational challenges involved’ in a public-private 
partnership (PPP) to increase the economic viability for both parties (Hartmann et al., 2014, p. 174). 
2.2. Energy service contracting of end-use energy demand technologies 
Third-party contractors such as ESCos can be efficient suppliers, especially when it comes to energy-
related services (Helle, 1997; Sorrell, 2007). This paper focuses on energy performance contracts 
(EPCs). The ESCo assumes control over the secondary conversion equipment and associated control 
equipment. This allows the ESCo to identify, deliver and maintain savings using guarantees for certain 
standards (of lighting service) at a particular cost, which is typically lower than its customers’ current 
or projected energy bill (Hannon et al., 2013; Marino et al., 2011; Sorrell, 2007, 2005). 
A tendency towards outsourcing, rising energy prices, continuing market liberalisation and 
environmental concerns benefit ESCo markets (Bertoldi et al., 2006; Marino et al., 2011). As an ESCo 
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assumes control over conversion equipment during an EPC (see Sorrell, 2007 for more details) it could 
also accelerate the uptake of innovative EUEDs by addressing the aforementioned barriers, especially 
technological, competency and economic or investment barriers. For example, an ESCo may be able 
to reduce the cost for energy by deploying (novel) EUEDs and management systems, which usually 
require enhanced competencies and high upfront investments. However, this process might be 
hampered by barriers to EPC itself. In the public sector in particular these include a lack of awareness, 
low priority, lack of confidence in standardised measurement and verification (M&V) of energy 
savings and general uncertainty regarding energy efficiency investments, legal complexities, volatile 
energy prices, missing energy cost information, difficult access to finance, business risk and mistrust 
against ESCos (Marino et al., 2011; Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014).  
Despite the barriers to EPC, the public sector EPC market is expected to grow in the coming years as 
ESCos co-evolve with a transition towards a more sustainable energy system (Hannon et al., 2013). 
Pätäri and Sinkkonen (2014) highlight difficulties with ESCos in the public sector, such as lack of 
knowledge, skills and resources for EPCs. Furthermore, Hannon and Bolton (2014) analysed the 
strengths and weaknesses of energy service contracting (with a focus on energy supply contracts) for 
municipalities. They conclude that the decision for a municipality to establish a partnership with a 
third-party ESCo will depend on its risk-aversion, the extent to which it wants to retain strategic 
control and the resources it has at its disposal. 
2.3. Research gaps identified in the literature  
With our analysis we address the calls for research by Pätäri and Sinkkonen (2014), Roehrich et al. 
(2014) and Hannon and Bolton (2014) into successes and failures of energy service contracting in 
order to derive success factors for the ESCo solution in the context of PPP and public procurement. 
Energy service contracts have been shown to be suitable for reducing energy costs for some energy 
services (Helle, 1997; Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014; Sorrell, 2007) and to exhibit elements of a 
transformative power towards an alternative market design of a performance-based economy (Haas et 
al., 2008; Hannon et al., 2013; Steinberger et al., 2009). LED lighting has been analysed at industry 
level (Sanderson and Simons, 2014; Smink et al., 2013) and household level, focusing specifically on 
adoption (Mills and Schleich, 2014), while the distinct context of public application has been 
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neglected, although this provides opportunities to combine climate change mitigation with alleviation 
of budget constraints The specific potential of energy service contracts to accelerate the 
commercialisation and diffusion of novel EUEDs has been neglected in the literature (Hypko et al., 
2010a; Roehrich et al., 2014; Steinberger et al., 2009). 
2.4. Analytical Framework: Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) represent the most prominent theoretical perspective to analyse 
modes of governance and institutional structures between hierarchies (internal) and markets (external) 
(Delmas, 1999; Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2014; Williamson, 1985). ‘Servitization’ refers to the 
outsourcing process as governance modes shift from hierarchies (in-house provision) to markets. 
Transaction costs depend on how the transaction is organised through governance structures and TCE 
makes ‘several key assumptions about managerial behaviour when determining which governance 
structure is most efficient for a particular transaction’ (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002, p. 2). 
Transaction costs (TC) are incurred within organisations through managing and monitoring personnel, 
procuring inputs and capital investment, in the word of Sorrell (2007: 512) “the costs associated with 
organising (‘governing‘) the provision of […] streams and/or services“. When the same streams 
and/or services are sourced from an external provider, transaction costs are associated with source 
selection, contract management and performance monitoring., dispute resolution (Pint and Baldwin, 
1997) and opportunistic behavior (Sorrell, 2007). Transactions are governed through structures, which 
are located on a spectrum with hierarchical organisations (internal) at one end and spot markets at the 
other with hybrid mechanisms in between (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002) (see Figure 1). 
 
With increasingly complex customisation of services, long-term contracts and more hierarchical 
governance structures are required, allowing for adjustment clauses to respond to contingencies (such 
as the emergence of more efficient technologies) over the life of a contract (Pint and Baldwin, 1997). 
According to TCE, the choice between long-term contracts (EPCs) and hierarchies (in-house 
Figure 1: Spectrum of governance structures (adapted from Pint and Baldwin (1997, p.4) 
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provision) depends on the magnitude of associated transaction (TC) and production costs (PC). We 
employ a model originally developed by Williamson (1985) and specified by Toffel (2002), Pint and 
Baldwin (1997) and Sorrell (2007). Sorrell’s model in particular focuses on the economics of energy 
service contracts, which allows the analysis of EPC vis-à-vis other modes of governance in Germany’s 
municipal street lighting market and their capacity to diffuse innovative EUEDs and enhance 
modernisation. 
According to TCE, the choice of governance structure also depends on characteristics of transactions 
as investment in transaction-specific (dedicated) assets may improve the efficiency of some 
transactions (Pint and Baldwin, 1997). An ESCo specialising in lighting, for instance, may already 
have acquired skills and established links with manufacturers and appropriate equipment for both 
operation and maintenance (O&M) and measurement and verification (M&V). Acquired skills and the 
buyer-seller relationship can be classified as human capital specificity while specialised equipment 
falls under technical asset specificity. Site or location specificity, another characteristic of transactions, 
is less of an issue in relation to street lighting. Dedicated resources is the degree to which institutions 
support a particular (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002). 
The assumption is that transactions featuring high technical asset specificity and dedicated resources 
are less likely to operate efficiently within market transactions as the party that has not invested, in this 
case the municipality, may threaten to cancel the contract to expropriate some of the invested value as 
it may assume that the ESCO would be unlikely to remove the lighting once installed. This is knows 
as opportunism, in the words of Williamson (1985, p. 4), ‘self-interest seeking with guile’. A further 
interference with the efficient operation of transactions is bounded rationality as decision-making is 
subject to constraints on time, attention, resources and the ability to process information (Pint and 
Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell, 2007, 2005; Toffel, 2002) (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Overview of characteristics and behaviours that can affect transaction costs (TC) (Pint and 
Baldwin, 1997; Toffel, 2002; Sorrell, 2007) 
Affect Competencies Examples 
Increase or reduce 
TC 
Human capital 
specificity Dedicated human resources for lighting 
Dedicated resources Specialisation in a particular area 
Increase TC 
Bounded rationality Limited time and capacity to analyse options 
Opportunism One party taking selfish advantage of circumstances 
 
Additional factors that influence the transaction costs of contracting are the complexity of the task 
(both replacing street lights or lamp posts and the complexity of monitoring performance according to 
contractual terms and conditions), the competitiveness of the energy service market and the 
institutional context in which contracting takes place (Sorrell, 2005). The institutional context can be 
affected by standardised tendering and procurement procedures and standardised M&V and projects 
such as the German ‘LED Lead Market Initiative’ (BMBF, 2014). Clients such as municipalities are 
only likely to enter an energy service contract if useful energy streams and final energy services can be 
supplied at a lower total cost compared to in-house provision. Total cost are the sum of firstly 
production costs (PC), “the expenditures for inputs such as fuel and electricity”, which depend on 
technical and operational efficiency of the equipment and secondly transaction costs (TC) as outlined 
in this section (Sorrell, 2007, p. 512).  
To summarise, the viability of energy service contracts is assumed to be determined by the following 
factors affecting TC (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell, 2007; Toffel, 2002): 
1. Technical asset specificity; 
2. Human capital specificity; 
3. Dedicated resources; 
4. Task complexity; 
5. Competitiveness of the market; 
6. Institutional framework. 
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As we have identified the institutional framework as a factor also affecting the diffusion of EUEDs it 
is not included in our TC factors of the analysis in section 3.  
3. Methods and research design 
We apply the TCE framework to help understand the relationship between the uptake of energy 
efficiency technology and energy service contracts. Our analysis covers the intersection of LED and 
ESCo markets (where ESCo models are employed for LED diffusion) as a case study (Miles and 
Huberman, 1999; Patton, 2002) using a longitudinal, multi-level analysis of key market players and 
key policy initiatives.  
3.1. Case study: LED street lighting and EPC in German municipalities 
As pointed out earlier, LED is currently on the path towards maturity in the technology life cycle, 
although LED lighting still features high upfront costs, especially compared to conventional 
technologies. In Germany, LED sales are growing due to numerous initiatives at the federal level. 
Until 2013 the ‘National Climate Initiative’ provided subsidies to municipalities for switching to LED, 
which covered on average 30% of the costs. The ‘LED Lead Market Initiative’, founded in 2009, 
brings together market players and policy decision-makers to identify barriers for the municipal 
diffusion of LED. These activities take place in the context of a wider Ecodesign context which phases 
out several energy-related products, such as many conventional lighting products in 2015, as a result 
of low efficiencies (Schischke et al., 2008). 
9.5 million public outdoor lights installed in Germany consume approximately 4 billion KWh of 
electricity per year, which corresponds to energy costs of about 750 Mio €. This number represents 
approximately one third of municipal energy costs. The potential savings by using new energy 
efficient lighting systems (especially innovative LED) amount to 400 Mio. € per year (dena, 2012; 
DStGB, 2010), although numbers regarding refurbishments of old lighting systems are missing (dena, 
2012). Germany’s market for public street lighting is highly dispersed, consisting of more than 11000 
municipalities with individual decision-makers.  
An important feature of public street lighting in Germany is the prominence of local multi-utility 
companies (MUCo) known as ‘Stadtwerke’ providing municipal lighting services. Although strong 
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local embedding ensures near monopolies on most supply and waste streams, providing incentives for 
integrated solutions (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006), this arrangement can represent a barrier for 
competition. The primary motivation for municipalities to engage with suppliers such as ESCos is the 
promise of final energy services such as lighting at a lower cost compared to in-house or MUCo 
provision. 
The German energy service contracting market, one of the largest, most heterogeneous and most 
mature in Europe with approximately 250-500 active companies, experienced stable growth over 
recent years. Among the dominant companies are EUCos2, MUCos3 and ESCos (Bertoldi et al., 2006; 
Marino et al., 2011). EPCs are gaining more acceptance among customers although the market has 
reached only 10% of its potential (Duscha et al., 2013). We identified 10 companies that offer lighting 
services to municipalities, which include subsidiaries of EUCos or infrastructure providers.  
Historically, different forms of governance in the provision of lighting have emerged. 27% of the 
municipalities provide street lighting in-house, 35% outsourced the management to EUCos, another 
10% to MUCos and 25% partially outsourced services such as maintenance. 3% of the municipalities 
employ an ESCo to manage their street lighting (dena, 2012). Figure 2 depicts the main actors that 
take part in the process. Regulatory bodies oversee municipal finances and partially have to approve 
budgets, especially when the municipality is in financial turmoil. Financiers mostly consist of 
(government-owned) banks. 
                                                     
2EUCos stands for a national Energy Utility Company, which typically engage in energy generation and supply. 
They may also engage in distribution and transmission (see Hannon et al., 2013, p. 1036). 
3 MUCos stands for Multi-Utility Company. In the German context this refers specifically to local ‘Stadtwerke’, 
which tend to provide a wide range of utilities such as gas, electricity and municipal waste management. 
Strong local embedding ensures that these MUCos enjoy near monopolies on most supply and waste 
streams which can provide incentives for integrated solutions (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2006) 
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 As established in 2.1.4, the choice of supplier represents a choice of governance structure. In-house 
provision represents a hierarchical governance structure. EUCo contracts can be considered relational 
contracts as they focus on the terms of the relationship, while MUCo contracts fall under the same 
category although they their contractual relationship can be more dynamic as their business model 
may shift towards privatisation (market) or ‘recommunalisation’ (hierarchy) of municipal enterprises. 
In fact, Germany is witnessing a trend towards ‘recommunalisation’ with 1/3 of respondents to one 
study indicating interest in more hierarchical approaches specifically for energy supply 
(PublicGovernance, 2011). ESCo provision represent long-term contracts, the most market-based 
governance structure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overview about actors and modes of lighting governance 
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Table 2: Spectrum of Governance Structures (adapted from Pint and Baldwin (1997, p. 4)) 
Vertical 
integration — 
Relational 
contracts — 
Long-term 
contracts — 
Simple short-
term 
contracts 
— Spot markets 
        Examples         
In-house 
lighting 
provision 
— 
MUCo or 
EUCo 
contract for 
lighting 
provision 
— 
Energy 
performance 
contracts for 
lighting with 
ESCos 
— 
Lighting 
arrangement 
for a 
recurring 
event 
— 
Lighting 
arrangement 
for a one-off 
event 
 
ESCos may be able to provide certainty over savings in PC for a specified quantity and quality 
(performance) of lighting if replacement LED EUEDs can be financed, operated and maintained over 
the duration of a contract at lower cost compared to in-house or EUCo/MUCo provision. The 
complexity of long-term energy service contracts compared to relational contracts or conventional in-
house procurement of equipment increases the TC of negotiating and managing the relationship with 
the (energy) service provider or manufacturer (combination of human capital specificity and bounded 
rationality). Consequently, production costs (PC) resulting from the physical characteristics of the 
energy system and the technical efficiency of organisational arrangements need to be lower for this 
model to be economically viable (Sorrell, 2007). 
The case of energy service contracting for public sector LED street lighting provides a good example 
as potential savings are high (for example, LEDs are ten times more efficient than halogen for the 
same light output (Bennich et al., 2014)), the capacity of municipalities to invest in these EUEDs is, as 
mentioned above, limited (Hartmann et al., 2014), while the DStGB streamlines the outsourcing 
process by offering standardised contracts (SBI, 2013). Municipal benefits of abandoning the in-house 
approach in favour of energy service contracting may arise out of reductions in energy costs, less 
exposure to energy price fluctuation and the transfer of risk, allowing the municipality to focus on core 
activities. EPCs are only possible if the ESCo succeeds at addressing technology factors, competency 
and capacity factors, as well as institutional factors which will be analysed in more detail in the results 
section. 
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3.2. Data Collection 
Data was collected through an extensive longitudinal archival document analysis (i.e. context of 
lighting and ESCo markets from 2008-2013) and interviews which permits us to reflect upon changes 
in the industry and institutional context. The documents consist of industry reports for lighting, energy 
services and public procurement from industry experts such as energy agencies, official government 
bodies or industry associations. In addition as two of the three authors participated regularly in 
meetings of the German ‘LED Lead Market Initiative’, we also analysed the minutes of meetings 
regarding important topics for each of the participating stakeholders (i.e. manufacturers, government 
officials, ESCos and others). 
The main empirical focus of this paper lies on the analysis of 40 semi structured interviews with key 
stakeholders. The interviews took place from October 2013 until January 2014. We selected interview 
partners according to an approach suggested by Seawright & Gerring (2008). After an initial screening 
we selected the most influential stakeholders in the process of LED application in German 
municipalities by consulting experts from the ‘LED Lead Market Initiative’. Thus we selected 
stakeholders that directly engage in the process of modernisation (see Figure 2). For each of the modes 
of governance we compiled typical cases that are representative. Hence we combined snowball 
sampling and purposeful sampling strategies. An overview of our sample can be drawn from Table 
A.1. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 1,5 hours and were conducted face-to-face or via 
telephone with one to two researchers present. The interviews have been recorded (for later 
verification) and notes have been taken. Representative quotes have then been translated into English. 
Questions during the interviews revolved around two main topics, notably modernisation of public 
street lighting (participating actors, processes and facilitators) and the role of energy service contracts 
(see appendix for detailed questions). 
3.3. Data Analysis 
We systematically evaluated the collected archival documents from 2008 onwards. We then analysed 
the interview protocols and reflected these against the bulk of documentations. We analysed the 
material according to the research question concerning barriers to the uptake of innovative end-use 
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energy demand technologies as well as the possible role of EPC for accelerated uptake of public LED 
street lighting. In this process we identified the following main topics:  
x Technological drivers and barriers  
x Institutional drivers and barriers 
x Economic and financial drivers and barriers  
x Competency and capacities as both are required to examine and technological, institutional 
and economic/financial barriers and to enhance the diffusion of innovative EUEDs 
These were reflected against concepts of TCE (technical asset specificity, human capital specificity, 
dedicated resources, task complexity and competitiveness of market) in an ‘abductive’ process 
(Mantere, 2008), i.e. the back and forth between theory, interview transcripts and archival documents. 
We then compared the modes of lighting governance, highlighting the suitability for each in different 
situations (financial situation, competency and capacity of actors, institutional set-up) to derive policy 
implications for municipalities and government.  
4. Results: Factors affecting the diffusion of LED street lighting and EPC 
This section gives an overview about factors affecting the uptake of EUEDs and the corresponding 
TCE interpretation. Hence we present the drivers and barriers that increase or lower the TC and PC for 
different modes of governance (see Table 3 for an overview). 
4.1. Technological factors 
LED lighting provides a technological advantage over conventional lighting which is a main driver for 
its use: higher energy efficiency. Thus this technology exhibits a high potential for energy (and PC) 
savings, which would suit an outsourcing solution. The first set of barriers to the modernisation 
comprises technological aspects such as the maturity of the products, complexity and uncertainty 
regarding energy savings and lifetime. ‘There is tremendous uncertainty regarding new measures to 
evaluate the performance of LEDs, for example maintenance factors and payback periods.’ 
(Manufacturer) LED customers such as municipalities and ESCos in particular further highlighted the 
missing standardisation and short warranties of LED due to the early stage in the innovation cycle as 
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well as technological path-dependency relating to less innovative and less efficient lighting systems 
which are currently being installed. ‘Many sales people from LED manufacturers have been to our 
town. There are too many standards and warranty mechanisms.’ (Municipal representative) As this 
municipal representative suggests, technical change and the lack of standardisation may increase 
opportunism on behalf of the technology providers. These barriers translate into higher TC as the both 
technical asset specificity of LED lighting and the task complexity of both assessing technology offers 
up-front and M&V for potential savings . 
4.2. Competency and capacity factors 
A push for open-book accounting was a robust success factor for lowering TC as the availability of 
consumptions figures lowers the risk of opportunism on behalf of the municipality since anticipated 
cost-savings are one of the main drivers for municipalities to modernise their lighting infrastructure. 
This lowers the human capital specificity of EPC as it reduces the ESCo’s need for acquiring 
information to perform the contract. I think one of the main barriers is the municipal accounting 
system. Usually the overall costs for running their lighting system are higher than what we estimate 
during the planning process. (ESCo)  
The interviewees further highlighted the positive role of facilitators (e.g. energy agencies) and other 
consultants as well as best practice examples during the tender and implementation process as they 
provided the necessary lighting and planning expertise. Facilitators hold a critical position as they are 
able to reduce the risk of opportunism by making the task of determining cost savings less complex. 
These success factors lower the TC both for in-house modernisation and ESCo solutions, as 
independent advice provides a more concrete overview of available options, thus reducing search costs 
and the human capital specificity required to search for alternative options. If, on the other hand, 
intermediaries and facilitators between ESCos and municipalities suffer from a lack of lighting 
competence, a bias towards established technologies and a lack of understanding about the complex 
tendering processes, the task of determining savings may remain complex. The building and energy 
context require a lot of expertise. Energy consultants are lacking the competence for lighting 
functional tendering. So manufacturers and their tools to calculate savings dominate the market. 
17 
(Energy consultant) Low human capital specificity of facilitators increases the danger of opportunism 
by suppliers, which increases TC for ESCo solutions.  
Cost transparency and cost management systems increase the tendency towards an EPC solution for 
modernisation as the procuring agency can compare baseline and future scenarios. The main 
preconditions for effectively modernising the lighting systems lie in a lighting database and a clear 
guideline. So you turn that into a functional, neutral tender. (Municipal representative) In addition, 
the early involvement of decision makers from local government and administration further facilitate 
their use. Neutral tenders ensure technology-free bidding and realisation and are more likely to be an 
ESCo competence. Manufacturers enter into competition for the collaboration with an ESCo, which 
results in lower prices and higher quality lighting products, which then can be implemented in ESCo 
projects. These factors reduce human capital specificity and task complexity as potential savings can 
be anticipated and adequate tenders be set up, thus lowering TC for ESCos as services provided by the 
contract are well defined. 
Competency barriers relate to the capacity of the actors to overcome technological, market and 
institutional barriers. Many people simply ignore the risks and do the modernisation on their own. 
(ESCo) On the one hand municipal representatives often fail to evaluate the market for LED lighting 
concerning quality, energy savings and risks. The implementation of the modernisation is demanding. 
You need to know the technical details and test examples in practice. (Municipal representative) On 
the other hand, municipal representatives lack the administrative competency to design tenders to 
reflect appropriately their quality and endurance criteria and carry out comprehensive budgeting and 
cost management throughout the procurement process of modern LED street lighting. Usually they 
[municipal representatives] don't know about their own costs for lighting. Data about the old lighting 
systems in terms of energy costs, investments etc. is missing. (Manufacturer) These competencies were 
not necessary in the past, as more efficient technologies evolved slowly. In the case of low human 
capital specificity dedicated towards municipal energy management, outsourcing may be sensible 
option but the difficulty of designing tenders may provide too complex a task for a municipality to 
consider, translating into high TC and a difficult choice between realisation of modernisation and 
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possible outsourcing options. Our results show that the responsible decision-makers tend to ignore or 
reject these solutions as the perceived human capital specificity is too high. 
4.3. Institutional factors 
From the analysis we derive institutional drivers which have a varied effect on the TC involved for 
different governance modes to modernise municipal lighting. These include an alignment of interests 
between different administrative bodies that are responsible for lighting, acceptance for the new 
lighting technology by the local population and the procuring organisation. Additionally, financial 
service providers act as drivers of energy efficiency projects, since they provide necessary risk and 
return structures. 
Barriers on the demand side relate to institutional problems such as the property situation (many 
municipalities sold their street lighting to national EUCos) and specific structural arrangements for the 
provision of public street lighting which has historically been a task for MUCos. Existing contracts 
with national EUCos often run for a very long time and the national EUCo only complies with the 
legal minimum when it comes to efficiency. A switch to LEDs, which would make sense, does not 
happen, they use less efficient technologies. (ESCo) The interviewees also referred to the inadequate 
infrastructure for the new LED technology. Time consuming and costly procedures to switch to 
another contractor translate into human capital specificity and increase TC for EPCs as a favourable 
institutional context is needed.  
Experts also referred to problems on the supply side (i.e. in the ESCo market) as only few ESCos exist 
that target the lighting market. Street lighting does not receive the attention it deserves in terms of 
potential cost savings and improvements in quality of light. (Energy agency) Manufacturers (OEMs), 
which could also act as ESCos did not show willingness to enter the service based market segment as 
they perceived the margins as low and complexity as high, although they act as providers of secondary 
conversation equipment. Specialised ESCos gain a competitive advantage in the field of lighting, 
although the low competitiveness in the ESCo market increases TC as it reduces the likelihood of 
municipalities considering outsourcing using EPCs. 
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When, on the other hand, municipalities are willing to engage in ESCo solutions, experiences tend to 
be positive. The risks taken by the ESCo surpass the amount of financial savings I have when I do the 
modernisation on my own (Municipal representative). In this case the human capital specificity 
associated with lowering the risk of in-house EUED retrofit is too high, which reduces TC for long-
term contracts and more market-based governance structures.  
Efforts required to govern the relationship relate to the task complexity and human capital specificity 
of negotiating and monitoring contracts. There is a complexity problem. Many contract documents are 
longer than 50 pages (Financial service provider). Regarding energy service contract design, the 
experts highlight transparency, comprehensibility and a distinct guarantee for energy savings as 
beneficial. Guidelines, transparency of the energy service contract and an ESCo that selects high 
quality products turned out to be successful. (Municipal representative) Increasing know-how and 
enabling structures for the modernisation process could significantly reduce task complexity of 
outsourcing particularly if contractual arrangements align interests by providing transparency and 
flexibility. 
Regarding the energy service contract design, municipal actors in particular also emphasised the need 
for flexibility (e.g. to change or improve lighting systems) and a fair balance of interests during the 
contract as a prerequisite for EPCs. We need flexibility regarding, short- medium- and long-term 
developments in the markets. (Municipal representative) An exact definition of the baseline, however, 
often proves difficult. Complexity of EPC leads to high TC. Exact numbers are needed. (Energy 
agency) EPCs also need to be checked by the regulatory bodies when municipalities run on a very 
tight budget in need of consolidation. The regulating authorities need to approve the energy service 
contract. The financing over the contract duration need to be assured (Municipal agency). 
Administrative approval represents a dedicated institutional resource to mitigate against bounded 
rationality on behalf of the municipality. 
Additionally, long-term partnerships with manufacturers are often in place, which create technological 
and product-related lock-in effects. Manufacturers possess a lot of market power. They dictate the 
tenders because they have long lasting partnerships and thus can charge individual prices for each 
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customer, for example ESCos, MUCOs or EUCos. The manufacturers are the winners in this market. 
They often have long lasting partnerships with the municipalities, they supply analyses for free. Many 
tenders thus specify one product. (ESCo) Contractual barriers also relate to lighting arrangements with 
national EUCos, which prevents ESCos from entering the public lighting market. The contracts [with 
national EUCos] run for a very long time. The municipal representatives do not have expertise any 
more. (Energy agency)  
In sum, the institutional complexity of opening up lighting provision towards EPCs as well as 
partnerships with manufacturers, MUCOs and EUCos tend to increase the task complexity and in turn 
TC for outsourcing as they complicate the distribution of responsibilities among the actors involved. 
4.4. Economic/ investment factors 
Economic drivers result from PC savings, which EUCos and MUCOs can realise by lowering the cost 
for energy and better procurement conditions thanks to long lasting contracts with manufacturers. 
However, these companies might be subject to a conflict of interests, as they engage in selling 
electricity as opposed to providing energy efficiency services. Finally, traditionally conservative 
attitudes towards innovative technologies may also prevent them from deploying LED. ESCos, on the 
other hand, possess better procurement conditions for lighting equipment, which potentially favours an 
outsourcing solution. 
Economic barriers stem from the relatively high upfront costs of LED street lighting, particularly for 
municipalities as they typically run on a tight budget, in some cases tightly controlled by regulatory 
bodies with budgetary control powers (see Figure 2). Volatile energy prices and uncertain price 
developments for LED further constrain the payback of investments. These factors prevent 
municipalities from realising significant production cost savings, a prerequisite for using any mode of 
governance for modernisation. 
EUCos and MUCos on the one hand possess knowledge about the current lighting system and 
experience in providing maintenance services for the municipality. Hence a EUCo/MUCo solution 
may exhibit lower aggregate PC for the provision of the energy service. ESCos on the other hand often 
lack finance as they are not well established among financial service providers. ESCos need to 
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refinance themselves. However, forfeiting is not accepted by many municipalities. This leads to 
financial constraints on ESCos side. (Financial service provider) Thus an ESCo solution might exhibit 
higher financing costs, which lowers its potential to cut PC. 
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Factors affecting uptake of LED and choice of governance 
model  Transaction cost perspective Actions and human behaviour 
Specific TC for governance model 
Lowering TC Increasing TC 
Technical factors 
Measurement and verification 
of savings 
Technical asset specificity and 
task complexity 
Increases opportunism on 
behalf of the manufacturer   For ESCo solution 
Lack of standardisation Technical asset specificity and task complexity 
Increases opportunism on 
behalf of the manufacturer  
For general 
outsourcing 
Uncertainty regarding 
warranties 
Technical asset specificity and 
task complexity 
Increases opportunism on 
behalf of the manufacturer   
For general 
outsourcing 
Competency and capacity 
factors 
Open-book accounting Human capital specificity Reduces opportunism on behalf of the municipality For ESCo solution   
Expert facilitators Human capital specificity Reduces opportunism on behalf of the municipality For ESCo solution  
Cost transparency and neutral 
tenders 
Human capital specificity and 
task complexity 
Reduces time-consuming and 
costly search for alternatives For ESCo solution   
Institutional factors 
Lock-in contracts with existing 
suppliers Human capital specificity 
Time-consuming and costly 
search for alternatives to in-
house, MUCo or EUCo solution  
For ESCo solution 
Low ESCo market 
competitiveness 
Competitiveness of the 
market 
Time-consuming and costly 
search for alternatives to in-
house, MUCo or EUCo solution 
For in-house 
solution For ESCo solution 
Risk transferral Human capital specificity 
Risk taken by ESCo surpasses 
financial savings of in-house 
provision 
For ESCo solution  
Transparency of outsourcing 
procedure and contracts 
Human capital specificity and 
task complexity 
Transparency enables 
municipalities to consider ESCo 
solution 
For ESCo solution  
Administrative approval 
procedure Dedicated resources 
Mitigates against bounded 
rationality on behalf of the 
municipality 
For in-house 
solution   
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Economic/ investment factors 
EUCos and MUCos potentially 
selling and saving energy 
Competitiveness of the 
market 
ESCo independence from 
selling energy reduces conflict 
of interest 
For in-house or 
ESCo solution   
Allows ESCos and MUCos to 
reduce overall PC by reducing 
electricity tariffs for lighting 
For EUCo or 
MUCo solution  
Volatile energy prices and 
uncertain technological 
development trajectories 
Human capital specificity and 
task complexity 
Time-consuming and costly 
search for alternatives 
 
For in-house 
solution 
Experience of current lighting 
system and providing 
maintenance 
Dedicated resources ESCos lacking experience For EUCo or MUCo solution   
Table 3: TCE perspective - Factors affecting the governance of novel EUEDs 
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5. Discussion 
5.1. Factors affecting the diffusion of LED street lighting and associated services 
Previous research points towards technological, economic, competency and institutional factors 
influencing the diffusion of novel EUEDs (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Rogers, 1995; Schleich, 
2009; Sorrell et al., 2004; Wilson et al., 2012). We confirm these findings although our results 
show that these factors are especially strong in the case of public sector application due to 
specific institutional set-ups/ regulations and lower competency compared to private actors, 
which limits their ability to carry out a mission-oriented procuring policy or tenders (Edler and 
Georghiou, 2007; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012; Uyarra et al., 2014).  
Our results also show that at the interplay between services and technologies, institutional 
factors such as established relationships, flexibility or balance of interests are crucial to advance 
the uptake of EUEDs. Hence the interactions between procurer and innovator are critical to 
address the increasing complexity in procuring services and infrastructure (Hartmann et al., 
2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). Further barriers to EPC and EUED, such as the low priority 
of energy efficiency projects, uncertainty, legal and institutional problems, access to finance and 
difficulties defining baseline consumption figures (see Pätäri and Sinkkonen (2014); Marino et 
al. 2011) also prevail throughout our case study. 
Additionally, we highlight interdependencies among the barriers. Assessing these technological, 
institutional and economic barriers requires enhanced competencies on the municipal side and 
our analysis (see Table 3) reveals this missing capacity as a key element which has previously 
been ‘hidden’ in other factors such as ‘dedicated resources’ or ‘task complexity’ throughout the 
TCE literature (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell, 2007). Technological, economic and 
competency barriers can be addressed through a change in the governance structure. Analysed 
through the lens of TCE, drivers and barriers that constitute a factor relate to higher or lower TC 
depending on the mode of governance (see Table 3). With this analysis we partially integrate 
literature on the diffusion and adoption of EUEDs and TCE that have previously been used for 
the analysis of barriers to energy efficiency (Sorrell, 2005; Sorrell et al., 2004). 
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5.2. Modes of governance for novel end-use energy demand technologies 
As highlighted by Roehrich et al. (2014); Schleich (2009) and Sorrell et al., (2004), the 
tendency of customers to ‘wait’ for technological improvements provides an incentive for 
outsourcing solutions for innovative products. Depending on the institutional set-up and country 
characteristics, municipalities possess various options.  
First of all municipalities could manage the modernisation of the street lighting installations in-
house. This requires significant technical and commercial know-how to evaluate technologies, 
markets and the institutional background to achieve an economically viable solution. These 
translate into high TC for modernisation as the human capital and technical asset specificity for 
the innovative technology are high. There is also a danger of lower PC savings by deploying 
inefficient products. On the other hand, municipalities are able to significantly lower the TC a 
more market based solution would incur through open book accounting and transparent 
tendering. However, the task complexity for managing the contract, especially with a private 
third-party ESCo should not be underestimated (See Table 3). 
Second, municipalities in Germany tend to choose relational contracts with EUCOs or MUCos. 
Historically, MUCos in particular have been contracted to manage municipal street lighting in 
Germany. As these trusted relationships feature interwoven knowledge of existing technologies 
and infrastructure (Backlund and Eidenskog, 2013), the task complexity for contract 
management and the human and technical asset specificity of EUCo or MUCo solutions for 
modernisation are likely to be low (see Table 3). Relational contracts particularly with a MUCo 
could therefore have an advantage over a third-party ESCo solution. On the other hand, these 
companies usually sell final energy to the municipality as well, which reduces their incentive to 
apply novel EUEDs technologies.  
Third, with an ESCo solution, customers are able to achieve cost savings from the beginning of 
the contract and additional cost savings due to freed personnel capacity. They can transfer risks 
and uncertainty regarding technological components and development. One representative of a 
facilitating organisation precisely framed the potential role of EPC: ‘[Energy performance] 
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contracting is a means to accelerate the diffusion and adoption of innovative energy efficiency 
technologies.’ We thereby confirm earlier research suggesting that PPPs can foster innovation, 
technical knowledge and skills as well as managerial efficiency (Roehrich et al., 2014). 
We also confirm the view of previous studies (Hypko et al., 2010a, 2010b) that performance-
based contracts lead to lower costs in the provision of energy services, although customers 
demand high flexibility during the contract duration as they fear a lock-in into unknown new 
technologies. In that case, scholars suggest an emphasis on the establishment of trusting 
relationships, particularly during the set-up of the contract (Backlund and Eidenskog, 2013; 
Roehrich and Lewis, 2014), which may again benefit a MUCo solution. To fully exploit this 
potential in the municipal context, we can confirm the need for tenders not to over-specify to 
allow technology neutral bidding originally proposed by Uyarra et al. (2014). 
To address these barriers and to reduce TC our research highlights experienced consulting 
services and the early involvement of decision-makers from local government and 
administration to ensure a transparent process and open tenders. Other possible institutional 
barriers such as regulations concerning lighting and maintenance and existing partnerships with 
MUCos or EUCos might jeopardize ESCos’ potential to accelerate the diffusion of EUEDs. Our 
findings thereby concretise earlier work by Hannon et al. (2013), Hannon & Bolton (2014) and 
Marino et al. (2011).  
5.3. TCE provide a useful lens to study the product-service relationship for novel end-use 
energy demand technologies and EPC 
Many of our case study participants considered the energy service fee comparatively low 
compared to the risk and complexity associated with in-house search for new products and 
services. In the absence of MUCos, ESCos can therefore reduce human capital specificity 
required to perform modernisation in-house and contribute to reducing opportunistic behaviour 
towards the municipality (Pint and Baldwin, 1997). Table 3 suggests that standard procurement 
rules, model contracts as well as facilitators could help lower TC for ESCo solutions, which 
coincides with earlier findings by (Bleyl et al., 2013; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014).  
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Above all, our major contribution revolves around the TCE perspective on the uptake of 
innovative EUEDs and the different modes of governance. Factors influencing the diffusion of 
EUEDs (technology, competency, institutional and economic) have been related to factors 
influencing the TC of different governance modes (technical asset and human capital specificity, 
dedicated resources, task complexity, competitiveness) , taking into account human behaviours 
relevant to TC (opportunism and bounded rationality) to compare the viability of EPCs vis-a-vis 
other modes of governance. Public sector LED street lighting is likely to fulfil several 
preconditions hypothesized by Sorrell (2007) for outsourcing using EPCs, although some 
assumptions about municipal street lighting do not hold as competence and institutional 
problems prevail.  
EPCs might even be a means to reduce occurring TC and thus accelerate the diffusion and 
application, especially when a trusted MUCo is absent and the municipality features low in-
house competence and a tight budget. Based on our results we argue to include the notion of 
competencies (quality and quantity) which tend to be ‘hidden’ behind ‘dedicated resources’ and 
‘human capital specificity’ in TCE frameworks (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Sorrell, 2007; Toffel, 
2002). 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
6.1. Conclusions 
An accelerated uptake of innovative EUEDs among public actors such as municipalities is 
economically and socially desirable for a number of reasons. First, it bears a huge (mostly 
untapped) potential for realising CO2 emission reductions. Second, it reduces energy 
dependency and provides a relief for public budgets. Third, it may increase economic growth in 
the (domestic) EUEDs industry. On the one hand, our results show that ESCos represent a 
vehicle for the commercialisation and diffusion of innovative EUEDs by addressing barriers to 
technological diffusion through EPCs. This could be a public-private arrangement when 
procuring innovative products in a public context. On the other hand, high associated TC might 
hinder the diffusion of the ESCo solution and need to be addressed specifically. 
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However, we also highlight the discrepancy between theoretical fit of EPC and actual slow 
diffusion. As mentioned above, only 3% of the municipalities use this mode of governance, 
which points towards the existence of strong interdependencies between actors and a 
conservative institutional environment. This ‘lock-in’ may be a reason for the slow diffusion of 
LED lighting and/ or EPC. Our study therefore also points towards an institutional environment 
in Germany that appears to favour relational contracts over long-term contracts. A German 
municipality with a MUCo may want to strengthen its local capacity to manage energy and 
benefit from the diffusion of innovative EUEDs, rather than outsourcing.  
6.2. Policy implications 
In terms of policy implications we want to highlight the benefits of market transparency 
regarding both novel EUEDs and ways to source them. This can be done by either encouraging 
competitiveness among governance structures, which may benefit EPC solutions, or by 
supporting facilitators.  
The design and content of tenders emerged as a key phase during the adoption of LED 
technologies and outsourcing options. To address competency and capacity barriers, criteria to 
design these tenders should be widely diffused in order to increase competition among 
organisational (governance) structures. This could be done by introducing statutory obligations 
for tendering to include outsourcing options on a national or federal level. Additionally, 
institutional support could include the provision of documentation and guidelines or instruments 
to calculate baseline and savings (e.g. with standard tendering processes). Similarly 
technological standards or enhanced warranties to address technological complexity as well as 
standard contracts to address legal complexity (monitoring contractual terms and conditions) 
facilitate the use of EPC for innovative technologies, which could be established on a national 
level. 
Finally, policy makers need to address institutional barriers by providing the infrastructure 
necessary to make the transition towards EUEDs for example by rethinking long-term 
partnerships with MUCos or EUCos at the municipal level. Depending on the institutional set-
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up, establishing an EPC with a MUCo could also be a way to lower the costs and risk associated 
with modernisation. 
To foster the ESCo market, policy makers need to support facilitators (e.g. consultants or energy 
agencies) to disseminate specific technological and commercial knowledge at the state/ regional 
level. These intermediaries emerged as a key driver throughout our analysis. This could be done 
either by subsidising consultancy services or by supporting the market for energy consulting by 
establishing remunerations schemes to provide incentives for consultants to enter the market.  
EPC for lighting also faces a lack of finance, which represents a significant economic barrier. 
Government owned banks (such as Germany’s KfW) or governments themselves could provide 
guarantees for credits to increase the access to finance to increase the competitiveness of the 
LED street lighting market as a policy response on the national level. 
6.3. Limitations and future research 
Our use of TCE in exploratory qualitative research, as opposed to rigorous model testing, 
exhibits limitations regarding the measurability of the constructs. We nevertheless believe that 
our analysis uses TCE appropriately. Conclusions derived from this study, however, do not 
represent generalizable assumptions about the usefulness of EPC for the diffusion of EUEDs as 
this process is usually not linear. More factors than those analysed in this paper influencing the 
diffusion of innovative EUEDs need to be taken into account (e.g. behavioural factors). 
Additional markets could be valuable to explore as the viability of an ESCo solution is 
dependent on the institutional context. Another factor which determines the application of EPC 
is technology. Smart grids or smart homes could serve as another case study to explore the 
suitability of the ESCo solution for commercialisation and diffusion of EUEDs.  
Finally, the conditions for ESCos to maintain a competitive position vis-à-vis other actors 
(EUCos, MUCos, manufacturers, etc.) provide an interesting field of future research (Hannon et 
al., 2013). In relation to that, scholars could further explore why the creation of a market for 
EPC in a public context did not achieve its potential so far (Pätäri and Sinkkonen, 2014).  
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9. Appendix 
9.1. Interview guide 
Modernisation of public street lighting 
x How does the process of modernisation unfold in the municipalities?  
x Which technologies have been applied in the modernisation process?  
x What role did the participating actors (EUCos, MUCos ESCos, manufacturers and 
financial service providers) play?  
x What factors influence their decision making?  
x How does the regulatory or political environment influence the modernization process? 
Role of energy service contracts (EPC) 
x What are perceived specific success factors and barriers of EPC for LED street lighting 
in a municipal context?  
x How is technological and financial risk treated in these arrangements?  
x Can EPC accelerate the diffusion of eco-innovations? 
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9.2. Interview participants 
Table A.1: Sample 
Nr Category Position Format Date Interviewer 
1 Municipal representatives Lighting engineer Via telephone Oct 2013 FP, PvF 
2 Municipal representatives Member of 
parliament 
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP 
3 Municipal representatives Technical manager Via telephone Oct 2013 FP 
4 Municipal representatives Energy efficiency 
manager 
In person Jan 2014 FP 
5 Municipal representatives Building authority Via telephone Oct 2013 FP 
6 Municipal representatives Building authority Via telephone Nov 2013 FP 
7 Municipal representatives Lighting manager In person Nov 2013 FP 
8 Municipal representatives Building authority Via telephone Nov 2013 FP 
9 Municipal representatives Lighting manager Via telephone Nov 2013 FP 
10 Municipal representatives Lighting manager Via telephone Nov 2013 FP 
11 Municipal representatives Lighting manager In person Jan 2014 FP 
12 LED Manufacturers Engineer Via telephone Oct 2013 FP, PvF 
13 LED Manufacturers Business developer In person Nov 2013 FP 
14 LED Manufacturers Business developer Via telephone Dec 2013 FP 
15 LED Manufacturers CEO In person Jan 2014 FP 
16 LED Manufacturers Chief marketing 
officer 
In person Nov 2013 FP 
17 Energy service companies 
ESCos 
Business developer 
lighting 
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP 
18 Energy service companies 
ESCos 
Business developer 
lighting 
Via telephone Oc 2013 FP 
19 Energy service companies 
ESCos 
CEO Via telephone Nov 2013 PvF 
20 Energy service companies 
ESCos 
Business developer 
lighting 
Via telephone Nov 2013 FP 
21 Energy service companies 
ESCos 
Chief marketing 
officer 
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP 
22 Multi-utility companies 
MUCos 
CEO Via telephone Oct 2013 PvF 
23 Multi-utility companies 
MUCos 
Lighting manager Via telephone Nov 2013 FP 
24 Multi-utility companies 
MUCos 
Lighting manager Via telephone Dec 2013 FP 
25 Multi-utility companies 
MUCos 
CEO Via telephone Dec 2013 FP 
26 Multi-utility companies 
MUCos 
Lighting manager In person Jan 2014 FP 
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27 Financial service providers Key account 
manager for 
municipal clients 
Via telephone Nov 2013 PvF 
28 Financial service providers Expert on financing 
energy efficiency 
projects 
Via telephone Jan 2014 FP, PvF 
29 Financial service providers Key account 
manager for 
municipal clients 
Via telephone Jan 2014 FP, PvF 
30 Regulatory bodies Municipal 
budgetary expert 
Via telephone Jul 2013 FP 
31 Regulatory bodies Municipal 
budgetary expert 
Via telephone Jul 2013 FP 
32 Regulatory bodies Municipal 
budgetary expert 
Via telephone Jul 2013 FP 
33 Regulatory bodies Municipal 
budgetary expert 
Via telephone Oct 2013 FP 
34 Facilitators Energy agency Via telephone Oct 2013 FP 
35 Facilitators Energy agency Via telephone Oct 2013 FP 
36 Facilitators Public property 
manager 
In person Dec 2013 PvF 
37 Facilitators Energy consultant In person Nov 2013 FP 
38 Facilitators Energy consultant Via telephone Dec 2013 FP 
39 Facilitators Municipal agency Via telephone Dec 2013 FP 
40 Facilitators Energy agency Via telephone Nov 2013 FP 
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